2007-1 Milton Friedman - A Brief Obituary by Laidler, David
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Department of Economics Research Reports Economics Working Papers Archive
2007
2007-1 Milton Friedman - A Brief Obituary
David Laidler
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsresrpt
Part of the Economics Commons
Citation of this paper:
Laidler, David. "2007-1 Milton Friedman - A Brief Obituary." Department of Economics Research Reports, 2007-1. London, ON:
Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario (2007).
   
   
   
   
 
Milton Friedman - A Brief Obituary  
by  
David Laidler 
   
Research Report # 2007-1                             January 2007 
 
   
 
   
Department of Economics 
Research Report Series  
   
Department of Economics  
Social Science Centre  
The University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario, N6A 5C2  
Canada  
This research report is available as a downloadable pdf file on our website  
http://economics.uwo.ca/econref/WorkingPapers/departmentresearchreports.html. 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Milton Friedman - a Brief Obituary* 
 
         by 
 
           David Laidler 
                    Professor Emeritus at the University of Western Ontario 
                   Fellow in Residence at the C.D. Howe Institute 
 
 
 
This obituary has been prepared for the European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 
I am grateful to Jose Luis Cardoso, Robert Hetzel, Robert Leeson and Antoin Murphy for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract : Milton Friedman is rivaled only by John Maynard Keynes as the most influential 
political economists of the 20th  Century. His approach was that of a classical liberal, rather than 
a conservative, though this put him on the political right in the United States. Friedman’s work 
demands to be evaluated all of a piece, but his outstandingly important technical contributions to 
economics influenced the development of the discipline in ways that extended far beyond the 
purview of any particular political agenda.    
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I 
Milton Friedman was one of the most influential political economists of the twentieth century, 
and was much honoured for his work as well, receiving the AEA’s John Bates Clark Medal in 
1951, a Nobel Prize in 1976,  not to mention the United States’ Presidential Medal of Freedom 
and National Medal for Science in 1988.  
 
 To begin with his impact on the discipline of economics: the program of a recent 
conference marking the fiftieth anniversary of his (1953) essay on  “The Methodology of 
Positive Economics” (Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, 2003), termed it  “the 
most important piece of methodological writing in 20th century economics”; his 1940 Ph.D. 
thesis, eventually published as Income from Independent Professional Practice (Friedman and 
Simon Kuznets1945), is one of the founding works of modern labour economics; it is also the 
source of the permanent-transitory distinction that lay at the heart of  A Theory of the 
Consumption Function (1957) , a book which in its turn did much to change the direction of 
macroeconomic theory; and then, of course, there were his crucial contributions as a monetary 
theorist, applied econometrician, and narrative economic historian to what Harry Johnson (1971) 
called the “Monetarist Counter-revolution” in macroeconomics.  
 
 In the public arena Friedman’s influence derived from his tireless efforts, as author, 
journalist, lecturer, broadcaster and adviser to politicians to popularize and see implemented a 
political economy whose core beliefs are readily apparent from the titles of his two best selling 
books, Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and Free to Choose (1980), the former written with the 
assistance of, and the second co-authored by, his wife Rose Director Friedman. 
 
II    
Friedman was born in Brooklyn in 1912, to Jewish immigrants from an eastern province of the 
Habsburg Empire that is now part of the Ukraine. He was brought up in Rahway, New Jersey, 
educated in the public school system and he graduated from Rutgers University in 1932.  He 
went on to Chicago and then Columbia for graduate work, and in 1935 found his first 
employment in New Deal Washington while still working on his Ph. D. Applying the usual 
stereotype to such beginnings, one might have expected Friedman’s political economy to lean to 
the left, and the Presidents and presidential candidates he would later advise to have names like 
Kennedy, Johnson and Humphrey. Though the Friedman we now remember was no conservative 
- among his causes, as Robert Hetzel (2007) notes, were the abolition of the military draft 
(successful), the legalization of drugs and prostitution (unsuccessful) and the promotion of 
education vouchers (partially successful) - he was nevertheless a liberal in the traditional 
European, not the modern American, sense; and that is why he made his political home on the 
right, where the principal recipients of his advice were Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon and 
Ronald Reagan.  
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 Even so, Friedman did live up to the stereotype for a while. When he married in 1938, his 
brother-in-law-to-be, Aaron Director promised his sister “not to hold his very strong New Deal 
leanings - authoritarian to use an abusive term - against him” (Friedman and Friedman 1998,  
p. 81, fn.); his first writings on inflation (eg.1943) were indirectly inspired by Keynes (1940) and 
skeptical about the quantity theory’s usefulness, while his earliest work on macro-stabilization 
policy (1948) paid at least as much attention to fiscal as to monetary measures. The slow 
evolution of Friedman’s views on political economy must in part have been under the influence 
of his wife and brother-in-law, who underwent a similar shift of allegiance early in the 1930s 
when they drifted away from their original Chicago mentor, the at-that-time socialist under-
consumptionist Paul Douglas, into the circle of Frank H. Knight. But there is nothing in the 
record to contradict his own suggestion that his serious concern with public policy and political 
philosophy began in the early post-war years at Chicago, where “informal discussions with 
colleagues and friends stimulated a greater interest, which was reinforced by Friedrich Hayek’s 
powerful book The Road to Serfdom, by my attendance at the first meeting of the Mont Pelerin 
society in 1947, and by discussions with Hayek after he joined the university faculty in 1950. . .” 
(Friedman and Friedman, 1998, p. 333)            
 
 Whatever the influences, however, and Friedman was always more interested in the 
current relevance of ideas than in their historical origins, by 1962 he was arguing, in Capitalism 
and Freedom, that capitalism founded on voluntary exchange among well informed agents was a 
necessary condition for political freedom, and that, if not also sufficient, it nevertheless provided 
a firm foundation for the maintenance of such freedom where it already existed, and a powerful 
impetus to its development where it did not. Published at a time when John Kenneth Galbraith’s 
Affluent Society (1958) still defined the state of the art for popular economic writing in the US, 
when Europe’s welfare states appeared at last to be delivering prosperity after a long period of 
post-war reconstruction, and just as John F. Kennedy was launching his Great Society, this book 
seemed extremist, and was at first more often ignored than criticized by the guardians of 
informed opinion. The Economist, to its credit was an exception, commending it in anonymous 
(1963) review as “A Tract for the Times”, and noting its advocacy of, among other things, the 
use of a money-supply rule to generate built-in macroeconomic stability, flexible exchange rates, 
and a negative income tax.  
 
 Capitalism and Freedom’s most salient characteristic was its relentless application of the 
idea that bilateral voluntary exchange creates gains for both parties, and that the more 
widespread its use, the more widespread also are these gains likely to be. Those who, like this 
author, had the privilege of learning their price theory from Friedman in person in the early ‘60s 
soon noticed, as Robert Hetzel (2007) has also recently recorded, that what distinguished him 
was not his views on what everyday micro-economics said, but on how seriously its implications 
should be taken; and Capitalism and Freedom conveyed exactly this enthusiasm about 
competitive theory’s real-world relevance. This is what ultimately made it a classic, and helped 
to persuade many a skeptical reader to think hard about its political message. Friedman did not 
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put classical economic liberalism back on political economy’s map single-handedly of course, 
but Capitalism and Freedom was a major landmark on a road along which its author was 
thereafter to guide many. When Free to Choose appeared in1980, it was still a radical book, but 
its reception was a great deal more respectful, even among the many who still did not quite 
accept its whole message. 
 
III 
Friedman’s contribution to 20th century economic thought should be seen as all of a piece, 
because its popular and political components drew heavily on his scholarly and scientific output, 
but the latter nevertheless exerted an influence on the internal dynamics of economics  that was 
largely independent of the uses to which he himself put it within his own political economy. 
 
 For example, though much of Capitalism and Freedom - and later of Free to Choose as 
well - was based on the premise that the economic analysis of maximizing behaviour in 
competitive markets was of immediate and compelling empirical relevance, and though 
Friedman had earlier argued this view at considerable length in his (1953) essay on “The 
Methodology of Positive Economics”, this proposition was neither that essay’s central message 
nor the source of its subsequent academic influence. Rather, it was a by-product of Friedman’s 
use of contemporary debates about the merits of models of maximizing behaviour to illustrate 
the virtues of his recommended approach to any such debate. This was to judge economic 
theories, not by the “realism” of their assumptions, but by the extent to which their predictions 
are or are not supported by empirical evidence.  
 
 To be sure, Friedman had specific views about the relative merits of profit maximization 
and mark-up pricing as explanations of firms’ behaviour, and about the empirical relevance of 
the competitive model more generally; but it was neither necessary to share these in order to find 
his methodological prescriptions intriguing and challenging, not to say full of hidden difficulties 
when they were carefully examined in the light of competing approaches to the philosophy of 
science, nor even to take to heart their “softer” message, as expounded by Thomas Mayer 
(1992), that actually deploying economic theories as a basis for empirical research was likely to 
be a more useful activity than arguing in the abstract about whether they could or should be 
employed in this way in the first place.   
 
 Thus, though this 1953 essay was vital to the development of Friedman’s political 
economy, its subsequent status as a seminal work in the methodology of economics was quite 
independent of this. So too was its role in helping to persuade economists to pay more attention 
to empirical work, though here one must not overlook the influence of Karl Popper - not quite 
co-incidentally also a participant in that first 1947 meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society - on the 
LSE’s seminar in Methodology, Measurement and Testing and on Richard Lipsey’s magnificent 
textbook, An Introduction to Positive Economics (1963). Nor should one forget how much easier 
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systematic econometric work became as electric-mechanical calculators were replaced by 
electronic computers in the 1960s.  
 
 Friedman’s contributions to macroeconomics in general, and monetarism in particular, 
had a similar dual significance for the development of both the discipline and his own political 
economy, as I have argued at greater length in David Laidler (2005). A Theory of the 
Consumption Function located the consumption-saving decision in an explicitly stochastic 
environment, and then forged a link between the maximizing principles that had usually been 
deployed quite separately in economic and econometric theory to analyze that decision’s 
fundamentally forward looking nature. In this respect the work was seminal for the subsequent 
evolution of macroeconomics. So too, albeit on a less fundamental level, were the studies that 
emerged from Friedman’s Chicago Money Workshop from the early 1950s onwards (See e.g. 
Friedman (ed.) 1956 and David Meiselman (ed.) 1970). Many of these relied on the idea of an 
empirically stable demand for money function to analyze episodes of high and hyper-inflation in 
far off times and places, but some of this work also suggested that the same relationship might 
fruitfully be formulated as a special application of the permanent income hypothesis and applied 
to 20th century United States data. All of this, along with Friedman’s (1968) analysis of the  
influence of expectations about inflation on the behaviour of forward looking agents, and hence 
on the nature of the inflation-unemployment trade-off – from a purely technical standpoint 
identical to the contemporary work of Edmund Phelps (1967) -  provoked vigorous debates that 
kept applied macroeconomic research extremely lively well into the 1970s. 
 
 But that is not the whole story, for many of the policy implications yielded by this work 
also ran counter to the activist ideas that, as Hetzel (2007) has stressed, dominated economics 
well into the 1960s. His consumption function maintained the idea of a stable marginal 
propensity to consume, but applied it to permanent, rather than current income, thus rendering 
the marginal propensity to save out of the latter unstable; and it was this parameter whose 
empirical stability was required for the Keynesian multiplier concept to be used easily in the 
design of fiscal measures. Even as it downgraded the reliability of fiscal policy, moreover, 
Friedman’s work simultaneously made a case for the importance of monetary policy, or rather 
monetary policy of a particular sort. A stable demand for money function seemed to imply both 
that fixing the growth rate of the money supply by rule was the key to maintaining economic 
stability (Friedman 1960), and that rapid and unstable money growth would cause unstable 
inflation, even in the contemporary United States.  
 
These conclusions were in strong opposition to policy doctrines which emphasized 
discretionary stabilization policy, downplayed the significance of money, and interpreted 
inflationary pressures in modern economies as “cost-push” phenomena that perhaps required 
wage-price guidelines or even controls to contain them. Even so, not all of them followed 
immediately and necessarily from Friedman’s theoretical premises. In his hands, for example, 
the expectations augmented Phillips curve was a component of his case that the pursuit of 
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employment goals was not a proper role for monetary policy, whereas the implications that 
Phelps drew from the same analysis was simply that the inflation-unemployment trade-off was 
dynamic rather than static, and that policy aimed at achieving optimal unemployment had to take 
account of this.      
 
 But perhaps, in the long run,  the most significant contribution of  Friedman’s work on 
monetary questions was to undermine the central empirical preconception upon which the 
intellectual legitimacy of any kind of interventionist macro-policy rested: namely, that the 
experience of the Great Depression had demonstrated the inherent instability of the market 
economy. The chapters of A Monetary History of the United States (Friedman and Anna J. 
Schwartz 1963) that dealt with this episode made a detailed and compelling case that the 
Depression had in fact been the result, not of some fault in the market economy, but of monetary 
policies too inept and destabilizing for that economy to withstand. Though the economics 
profession took Friedman and Schwartz’s claims seriously from the start as an interpretation of a 
particular historical episode, debating and modifying them as it absorbed them, it took it longer 
to grasp that those claims also effectively destroyed the empirical support for by-the-1960s 
conventional views about the flawed nature of capitalism, and the need for continuously activist 
macroeconomic policy to ensure its survival. 
 
IV 
Keynes’ General Theory (1936) was published as the period whose economic ills it diagnosed 
was coming to its end. In remarkable contrast, Friedman’s doctrines were essentially complete 
before the onset of the great inflation that seemed both to confirm their validity and invite of 
them a cure, and it was not until the 1970s and ‘80s that they made their move from the realm of 
academic ideas into that of practical policy. This transition inflicted considerable damage on 
their reputation.  
 
 Not least, this was because their first trial run was in Chile, under the auspices of 
Augusto Pinochet, who in 1973 had, with support from the Nixon administration, overthrown an 
economically incompetent but nevertheless democratically elected socialist government, and set 
aside the constitution under which it had come to power  The resulting association of economic 
liberalism with murderous military dictatorship lent an awkward degree of credibility to the 
view, in wide circulation well before 1973, particularly in Europe and far beyond the confines of 
the hard left, that Friedman’s political economy, whatever might be claimed for it in principle, 
was in practice incompatible with democracy.  
 
 Though Friedman’s personal involvement in Chile was minor - a six day visit in early 
1975, under ostensibly private auspices, one forty-five minute meeting with Pinochet himself, 
followed up by a single letter - it generated protests and personal harassment that would dog him 
for years thereafter. The political and ethical issues raised by this affair are too complex for 
discussion here, but no historian of late twentieth century economic thought should ignore it, 
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because, fairly or not, it left stains on the reputations of classical economic liberalism, and of 
Friedman himself, that proved extremely hard to remove, witness the fact that as late as 1998, 
Friedman himself found it necessary to devote a whole chapter and an appendix in Two Lucky 
People to an account of the episode and a defense of his role in it. 
 
 Nor did all of Friedman’s more narrowly technical ideas work out well in the 1970s and 
‘80s. In particular, as Laidler (2005) discusses in greater detail, the money supply growth rule, 
which he had been recommending as a means of maintaining macroeconomic stability for two 
decades, turned out to be much harder to adapt to the task of restoring stability to the turbulent 
and inflation prone economies of the times than many had expected, not least because the 
capacity of institutional change within the financial system to undermine the stability of the 
demand-for-money functions on which it relied had been grossly underestimated. 
 
V 
Important though these criticisms are, however, Friedman’s reputation will surely survive them 
with ease. To begin with, his important long-term influence on the evolution of economics has 
already been noted above, and no amount of political controversy can change it. It is arguable 
too that the practical policy successes of his ideas comfortably outweigh their failures.  
 
 This is nowhere more evident than in the monetary field. Though, with the important 
exception of the ECB, it is nowadays hard to find a central bank that pays much attention to 
money growth, it is nevertheless taken for granted among those institutions that inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon, and therefore their responsibility. And it is almost as widely accepted 
that inflation cannot be controlled at the national level without exchange rate flexibility. In these 
respects, the phrase “monetarism without money” is an excellent first approximation to 
describing what has now become an essentially word-wide orthodoxy. Nor do we nowadays hear 
nearly as much about the virtues of economic planning or the need for activist fiscal policies to 
maintain economic stability as we did in the 1950s and ‘60s. Significantly also, the fact that a 
number of eastern European countries have demonstrated the possibility of moving from 
incompetent - and even authoritarian - socialism towards economic and political liberalism 
without military assistance is beginning to repair some of the damage done to that doctrine’s 
reputation by the Chilean episode.                  
 
 Even so, the contemporary world remains far from approximating Friedman’s 
uncompromising version of the classical liberal ideal. Notably, the welfare state remains alive 
and functioning, particularly in Europe. That is because, to use the Economist’s 1963 words, 
many still find “his notion that people who are neither children nor insane are responsible” too 
simple to make it the basis for the whole of economic and social policy, and because many of 
those “. . . who agree with him that one cannot be both a liberal and an egalitarian . . . [still]  feel 
that prisons, asylums and cash are insufficient to look after the poor and weak”.  
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 But taken overall, economic policy everywhere has moved significantly in Friedman’s 
preferred direction since the early 1960s, partly in response to events no doubt, but also under 
his influence. If his role in the development of his own discipline alone was enough to make him 
an economist of the first order of importance, therefore, this broader impact surely confirms 
Friedman’s status as one of the twentieth century’s greatest political economists. Perhaps only 
Keynes stands as a serious rival.    
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